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Attackers Used Qubole's Trusted AWS Access to Read Customers' Secrets and Copy S3 Data. Which Vendors Can Still Assume a Role in Your Cloud Account?

Obiguard Research Team·18 พฤศจิกายน 2569·4 min read

Wiz reports that an attacker used access tied to Qubole, a data lake platform owned by Idera, to break into multiple customers' AWS accounts between 14 and 26 October 2026, harvesting stored secrets and copying S3 data. The Hacker News covered the findings on 9 November. This article is based on that coverage and other secondary reports; we have not independently verified Wiz's research, and we did not find an official statement from Qubole or AWS.

What is reported

  • The access path: customers connect Qubole to AWS by creating an IAM role that trusts Qubole's AWS account. Reports say the attacker's requests succeeded because those roles still trusted that account, including at organisations that had stopped using Qubole.
  • What was read: Lambda environment variables, Secrets Manager entries and SSM Parameter Store values, followed by S3 data.
  • What happened next: the attacker is reported to have tested discovered credentials, including AWS keys, Microsoft Entra ID client secrets and Okta client credentials. That is how one cloud role becomes access to identity systems.
  • A separate window: Wiz also reports activity from 8 to 11 October using customer-owned AWS keys configured for Qubole. Wiz says it could not definitively link the two.
  • Unknowns: no group has been named, a confirmed customer count was not published, and Wiz does not say how the attacker obtained the access. Secondary summaries disagree on whose keys were used in the main campaign; most say Qubole's account was the entry point.

Why this matters beyond Qubole

The pattern is general. Every SaaS or data tool you connected to AWS left behind a role that trusts someone else's account. Those roles are rarely reviewed after the integration goes live, and they often carry broad read permissions because the vendor asked for them during setup. If the vendor's side is compromised, your logs show a legitimate AssumeRole from a trusted principal, not a failed login.

The second lesson is where secrets live. Environment variables and parameter stores are convenient, and a role with broad read access turns them into a single sweep. We described the same dynamic with stolen AI API keys used as cover and forgotten service accounts.

What to check now

  1. List every IAM role whose trust policy names an external AWS account. Match each to a vendor you still use. Delete the rest.
  2. Search CloudTrail from 1 October 2026 for AssumeRole events from vendor accounts. For Qubole, reports cite account 805246085872; confirm the identifier against Wiz's post rather than a summary. Look for source IPs outside AWS ranges.
  3. Review what each vendor role can read. Remove access to Secrets Manager, SSM parameters and Lambda configuration unless the integration needs it.
  4. Require an external ID and, where the vendor supports it, restrict by source IP in the trust policy.
  5. Rotate secrets that were readable by those roles, starting with identity-provider client secrets and long-lived access keys.
  6. Move secrets out of Lambda environment variables into a store with narrower, audited access.

How Obiguard SOC fits

Steps 2 and 3 depend on someone actually looking at cloud audit events: an AssumeRole from a vendor account at an odd hour, followed by a burst of secret reads. Obiguard SOC takes logs and metrics from the systems you already run through OpenTelemetry, so cloud audit events can be reviewed alongside the rest of your telemetry. Alerts come with a remediation plan split into now, this week and long-term, which is useful when the finding is a vendor role you had forgotten existed.

Scope matters. SOC works from the telemetry you connect to it. It does not edit your IAM trust policies, rotate your secrets, or see events that are not logged, so CloudTrail needs to be on and forwarded. To see how it would handle your AWS audit logs, get in touch or read about Obiguard SOC.

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